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This paper studies the effectiveness of different types of cohesion
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1 Introduction
There is a persistent gap in terms of economic performance and growth be-
tween different European regions. Despite large efforts to integrate European
economies the problem of real convergence in the European Union (EU) area
is to a large degree still unsolved and the effectiveness of the cohesion policy
measures is contested (see e.g. Boldrin and Canova (2001), Cappelen et al.
(2003), Aiello and Pupo (2012)).
EU policies to facilitate convergence of per capita income and productivity
refer to two broad areas. First, there is the funding of regional policies.
The European Fund for Regional Development (ERDF), the European Social
Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA) are the major pillars to spur cohesion. Second, European
integration has to a large degree, also been associated with the reduction of
barriers for a free flow of goods, labor, and capital.
This free flow of goods and production factors, however, makes it hard to
predict the spatial distribution of the policy effects and to specifically target
economic policy measures on the lagging regions. It is ex ante not clear how
a policy affects the economic performance of neighboring regions, and how
the neighboring regions’ economic performance feeds back on the region at
which the policy is targeted. Due to such feedbacks the overall effect might
well be negative such that a policy intended to accelerate the convergence
actually leads to divergence.
In our paper we analyze exactly these questions by considering short-,
medium- and long-term effects of policy measures, which aim at fostering
convergence, on output and real convergence in a two-region setup of an
agent-based macroeconomic model (the Eurace@Unibi model). We define
two policies that can be implemented in the less developed region. The first
policy is a human capital policy that leads to an upgrade of the general
skill level in the population. The second policy provides subsidies to those
firms that invest in the most recent technological vintages. These subsidies
give firms incentives to modernize their capital stock which can close the
technological gap to the superior region.
The choice of these policies for our experiments is strongly motivated by
the regional policies funded by the European Union.1 The ERDF aims at
strengthening economic and social cohesion in the EU by correcting imbal-
ances between its regions. In short and among other things, the ERDF
finances direct aid to investments in companies (in particular small and
1See http : //ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/index_en.cfm, accessed on
August 9th, 2012.
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medium sized enterprises) in order to create sustainable jobs. Large parts of
this fund are spent to support investments in physical capital, mostly through
non-repayable grants, but also other tools, such as soft loans. The ERDF
also supports the build-up of infrastructures notably linked to research and
innovation, telecommunications, environment, energy and transport. The
ESF is set up to improve employment and job opportunities in the Euro-
pean Union. This fund supports actions in the member states in the areas
of adapting workers and enterprises, lifelong learning schemes, designing and
spreading innovative working organizations. It also targets at strengthening
human capital by reforming education systems and setting up a network of
teaching establishments. This short description shows that under the roof of
these funds, we find mostly policies targeted at helping to build up human
capital and/or technology improvements.
The available budget for the ERDF and ESF is sizeable. For the period
from 2007 to 2013, 277 bn Euros are allocated which makes about 28.5%
of the total EU budged. As all the cohesion policy programs are matching
funds with co-financing by the member countries, total available funding is
almost 560 bn Euros which is about one quarter of the Italian and more than
one half of the Spanish yearly gross domestic product.
Although there is a vivid debate about the past success of EU cohesion
policy, which is based on a variety of econometric techniques (see Becker et al.
(2010) for a recent contribution and a brief survey of the relevant literature),
the model-supported basis for a prediction of the effect of such measures,
which target either the quality of human capital or technology upgrading
in a spatial framework with labor market frictions, is weak.2 Considering
the well established complementarity between workers’ skills and the level of
technology employed by firms (see our brief discussion in the next section) it
is clear, that each of these policies, if successful, should affect the dynamics
of both human and physical capital. The effective use and the adoption of
different vintages of technology in a region is influenced not only by policies
directly subsidizing physical investments, but also by the skill distribution in
that region, which is in turn influenced both by local human capital policies
2A rare model-based contribution related to the issues raised here is Arcalean et al.
(2012), where the authors study in the framework of a two region, two sector overlapping
generations model the effects of the allocation of structural funds between public education
and infrastructure. However, the paper differs in several respects from our main focus.
First, infrastructure provides a public good increasing productivity of all firms, whereas the
technology policy in this paper provides incentives for individual firms to acquire capital
goods of high quality thereby improving productivity of some selected firms (those who
invest). Second, a major aspect of our analysis, namely the complementarity between the
dynamics of skills of workers and technology choices of firms, is not present in Arcalean
et al. (2012). Also, spatial labor market frictions play no role in their analysis.
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and by the mobility of workers. Hence, although these cohesion policies all
aim at the improvement of the productivity in the target region, they rely
on quite different mechanisms and might therefore be differently affected by
varying degrees of spatial labor market frictions. For this reason, a sys-
tematic comparison of the effectiveness of policies targeting human capital
endowment and diffusion of technologies into weaker regions, as they are
center stage in European cohesion policies, as well as the interplay of these
policies with the policies fostering labor mobility between the regions, needs
further investigation. More specifically we seek to answer the following policy
related questions:
1. How does each of the considered cohesion policies affect output growth
in both regions and convergence?
2. How are the cohesion policy effects influenced by labor mobility?
Our aim is to address these questions under consideration of the complemen-
tarity of the dynamics of skills and quality of production technology on the
firm level, where this complementarity is due to learning by doing of workers
and endogenous technology choice by firms. Dealing with this complemen-
tarity requires a model that captures technology choices of individual firms,
where these choices are affected by firm specific characteristics like the avail-
ability of appropriate skills in the own workforce, as well as the evolution
of the distribution of (specific skills) in the workforce and skill specific labor
flows across regions.
We opt for a closed agent-based model with two regions as the most
appropriate tool to gain insights into the emergent dynamics on the labor
and goods markets. Heterogeneous firms and households interact on labor
and consumption goods markets. Productivity of firms is determined by the
specific skills of its workers (which are updated due to learning by doing)
as well as the quality of its vintage structured capital stock. New vintages
become available over time from the capital goods sector and are integrated
into the active capital stock based on investment and vintage choice decisions
of firms. Decision making of firms and households is modeled in a rule-based
manner, where the decision rules implemented in the model have strong
empirical foundations and resemble heuristics or rules of thumb that have
been put forward in the specific literature streams that deal with the different
decision problems arising for the agents in the model. This framework allows
us to use a strongly micro-founded model for the analysis of short, medium
and long run policy effects arising from heterogeneous and interacting firms
and workers in a spatial context. We set up the model in a way that one
region is initially endowed with a capital stock whose technological level is
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close to the frontier, while the other region’s capital shows a considerable
gap. The human capital differs in that the labor force in the first region
is better educated and, by working with the most recent technology, has
acquired higher specific skills than workers in the other region.
In order to examine the effectiveness of the policies targeted at the hu-
man capital and technologies, and to identify the importance of regional labor
market frictions, on output and convergence, we run and compare two dif-
ferent experimental setups. The two setups, within which the human capital
and technology policies are analyzed, differ with respect to the level of inte-
gration of the two local labor markets. In the first setup the labor markets
are fully integrated such that there are small frictions and all workers have
almost unhindered access to both local labor markets. In the other setup the
labor markets are completely separated and workers can only work in their
home region. These are two extremes where the former may be seen as the
political aim of an integrated European labor market. Actual labor mobility
across regions varies quite substantially within Europe (see e.g. European
Commission (2006)), where across larger distances and language barriers la-
bor flows are relatively small. In particular, cross country migration is still
low, although it increased after the recent EU enlargement.3 Commuting
across regions is a more relevant source of labor flows with the percentage of
commuters ranging from 2% to 20% for different EU countries, where, how-
ever, the largest part of the commuting takes place between regions within
the same country (European Commission (2006)).
Our analysis is based on a systematic statistical analysis of batches of sim-
ulation runs under the different policies in the two considered labor market
scenarios. As a methodological innovation to the literature on agent-based
policy models we use penalized spline estimates to capture the evolution of
policy impacts over time.
The main results of our analysis are that the human capital policy is only
effective in terms of fostering cohesion if labor markets are separated. If labor
markets are integrated, output actually falls in the lagging region at which the
policy is targeted. Technology policies speed up convergence for integrated
and separated labor markets and their effect is substantially stronger if they
are specified such that they incentivize firms to purchase latest vintages.
The mechanisms responsible for the strong influence of spatial labor market
frictions on the policy effects are identified and discussed. Thereby this paper
contributes to a better qualitative understanding of the reasons why cohesion
policy measures might have no effect or even effects that run counter the
3In 2010, 2.8% of working-age European citizens lived in another EU member state
compared to 2.0% in 2004 (European Commission (2011)).
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intention of the policy maker. These insights have clear policy implications,
which we discuss in the last section of the paper. The mechanisms we identify
rely on the interplay of labor flows of low and high skilled workers with the
technology choices of firms in a region and the shift of demand due to the
competitiveness of firms in different regions and do not seem to be considered
in the existing literature in this area. Also, the consideration of policy effects
on different time scales is an innovative contribution relative to previous
model based policy analyses.
In the following section we relate our contribution to the existing litera-
ture. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 introduces the policy experi-
ments and discusses the results. The last Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our contribution on evaluating the effects of EU policies on convergence is
mainly related to three streams of literature: work on technology adoption,
work on convergence and effects of cohesion policy, and work on agent-based
macroeconomic modeling. We briefly discuss our contribution relative to
these three streams.
Recently, based on a model of technology adoption as laid out in Comin
and Hobijn (2010), Comin and Hobijn (2011) provide evidence that U.S.
aid given within the Marshall plan accelerated the speed of adoption of new
technologies. Recurring on a sample of 10 technologies for 39 countries for the
postwar period, they find that countries which benefited from these policies
reduced on average the adoption lag for new technologies by 4 years. Further
important contributions studying technology adoption are Parente (1994),
Parente and Prescott (1994), or Basu and Weil (1998). We differ from this
work by modeling technology adoption as a process for which the availability
of a skilled workforce within a particular firm is crucial.
A simple macroeconomic model, where the technology choice of firms
is influenced by the local availability of skills, is developed and analyzed in
Caselli and Coleman (2006). Their model provides a good explanation for the
empirical observations that higher-income countries use skilled labor more
efficiently, but unskilled labor less efficiently than lower-income countries.
This work, however, does not consider the role of workers’ endowments of
skills on the firm level for the technology choices of firms and does not have
a policy focus.
Similarly to our policy experiments Mateos-Planas (2001) investigates
school effectiveness and distortions to the costs of technology adoption on
per-capita output, educational attainment, and age of technologies. There
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is technology specific learning, and education either improves the ability of
agents to learn new technologies or provides a productivity advantage. In
contrast, we model the interplay of general and specific skills of workers
within a firm, and incentives of firms to invest into new technologies. Workers
improve their specific skills on-the-job (see, e.g., Argote and Epple, 1990)
faster if they have higher general skills. Also, contrary to our contribution,
the analysis by Mateos-Planas (2001) lacks the spatial dimension.
Combining empirical work with a theoretical arguments based on an en-
dogenous growth model, Aghion et al. (2009) show that in regions, where
productivity is far from the frontier, educational investments in (research
oriented) universities have negative effects on local growth rates, due to the
outwards-migration of high-skilled workers. Although this empirical obser-
vation is in accordance with our findings the main focus of our underlying
model is quite distinct from that in Aghion et al. (2009). Contrary to our
focus on the interplay of the dynamics of firm’s technology choice, workers’
skill adjustment and inter-regional competition, they mainly study the al-
location of workers between imitative and innovative activities in a region,
assuming that the elasticity of skilled labor is higher in innovation than in
imitative activities. Furthermore, in their paper predictions of the effects of
policies regard long-run growth rates in one region, whereas we consider as
well short and medium run effects. In that sense our analysis should be seen
as complementary to that in Aghion et al. (2009).
Our modeling of firms’ technology choices also distinguishes this contri-
bution from the work based on the concept of directed technological change
(see, e.g. Acemoglu, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Contrary to the
majority of work in this area, where it is assumed that the intensity of R&D
leading to high quality capital goods is influenced by the (local) skill distri-
bution of workers, our focus is on the effects of the local skill distribution on
the technology choice of consumption good producers and, therefore, on the
speed of diffusion of new technologies in the economy.4
A large literature has studied convergence between countries or between
regions, mainly relying on the concept of ’β-convergence’ (see, e.g., Islam,
2003, for a review). Previous empirical work on, particularly, the effective-
ness of European regional policies with respect to regional convergence is
mixed. Studies taking a national perspective, such as Beugelsdijk and Ei-
jffinger (2005) find positive effects of the Structural Funds Program on GDP
growth, or at least conditionally positive effects (Ederveen et al., 2006) mean-
4Empirical evidence, based on firm level data, that the intensity of a firm’s innovative
activities is (positively) influenced by the skill level of its employees is provided by Piva
and Vivarelli (2009).
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ing that growth rates rise for countries with good institutions. For studies
using disaggregated regional data, the findings with respect to the growth
effects are inconclusive. One of the earliest attempts to evaluate the role
of the Structural Funds Programme can be found in Boldrin and Canova
(2001). They analyzed NUTS 2 data for 221 regions for the years 1980 to
1996, finding that disparities between regions were neither growing nor de-
creasing, and that EU policies have little relationship with fostering growth.
Contrarily, also using sub-national data, Cappelen et al. (2003) for example,
find positive growth effects. Ramajo et al. (2008) provide evidence for spatial
convergence clubs in Europe, and faster conditional convergence in relative
income of cohesion-fund countries, i.e. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
Finally, Becker et al. (2010) detect positive growth effects for so-called Ob-
jective 1 transfers within the structural program but no effects on regional
employment. Reasons for the differing findings may be that the data em-
ployed refers to various levels of disaggregation, and that some studies look
into the overall effect of the EU funding while others evaluated more specific
programs. We shall come back to this assessment in the concluding remarks
when mirroring our simulation results with these empirical findings.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on agent-based macroeconomic
modeling. In the last ten years a number of closed macroeconomic mod-
els using an agent-based approach have been developed (see, e.g. Gintis,
2007; Dosi et al., 2010; Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Ashraf et al., 2011; Dawid
et al., 2012a; Raberto et al., 2012; Wolf et al., 2012). Several of these agent-
based macroeconomic models have shown the importance of the approach
for economic policy design. For example, the effect of labor market inte-
gration policies on the convergence of regions has been analyzed by Dawid
et al. (2012a). Dosi et al. (2010) have looked into the (long run) effects of
policies aiming at the strengthening of demand and of policies facilitating
the speed of technological change as well the interaction of these polices.
Monetary policies are addressed in Ashraf et al. (2012) or Arifovic et al.
(2012), whereas regulatory issues relating to credit and financial markets
have been analyzed by Delli Gatti et al. (2010) or Ashraf et al. (2011) within
agent-based macroeconomic models. We differ from the existing agent-based
macroeconomic models as our set-up jointly features a spatial dimension and
technology adoption by firms which is complementary to an evolving stock




The Eurace@Unibi model describes an economy containing labor, consump-
tion goods, capital goods, financial and credit markets in a regional context.
The economy is inhabited by numerous instances of different types of agents:
firms (consumption goods producers and capital goods producers), house-
holds and banks. Each of these agents is located in one of the regions.
Additionally, there is a single central bank and a government that collects
taxes and finances social benefits as well as potentially some economic pol-
icy measures, where policies might differ between regions. Finally, there is
a statistical office (Eurostat) that collects data from all individual agents in
the economy and generates aggregate indicators according to standard proce-
dures. These indicators are distributed to the agents in the economy (which
might use them e.g. as input for their decision rules) and also stored in order
to facilitate the analysis of the simulation results. Due to space constraint
we will in this section only describe the main aspects of the model, which
are crucial for the understanding of the results discussed below. A detailed
description of the entire model is provided in Dawid et al. (2012b).
Capital goods of different quality are provided by capital goods producers
with infinite supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the best
currently available capital good) improves over time, where technological
change is driven by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the consump-
tion goods sector use capital goods combined with labor input to produce
consumption goods. The labor market is populated with workers that have
a finite number of general skill levels and acquire specific skills on the job,
which they need to fully exploit the technological advantages of the capital
employed in the production process. Every time when consumption goods
producers invest in new capital goods they decide which quality of capital
goods to select, thereby determining the speed by which new technologies
spread in the economy. Consumption goods are sold at local market plat-
forms (called malls), where firms store and offer their products and consumers
come to buy goods at posted prices. Labor market interaction is described
by a simple multi-round search-and-matching procedure where firms post va-
cancies, searching workers apply, firms make offers and workers accept/reject.
Wages of workers are determined, on the one hand, by the expectation the
employer has at the time of hiring about the level of specific skills of the
worker, and, on the other hand, by a base wage variable, which is influenced
by the (past) tightness of the labor market and determines the overall level of
wages paid by a particular employer. Banks collect deposits from households
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and firms and give credits to firms. The interest that firms have to pay on
the amount of their loan depends on the financial situation of the firm, and
the amount of the loan might be restricted by the bank’s liquidity and risk
exposure. There is a financial market where shares of single asset are traded,
namely an index bond containing all firms in the economy. The dividend
paid by each share at a certain point in time is determined by the sum of the
dividends currently paid by all firms. The central bank provides standing
facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks’ overnight
deposits and might provide fiat money to the government.
Firms that are not able to pay the financial commitments declare il-
liquidity. Furthermore, if at the end of the production cycle the firm has
negative net worth, the firm is insolvent and insolvency bankruptcy is de-
clared. In both cases it goes out of business, stops all productive activities
and all employees loose their jobs. The firm writes off a fraction of its debt
with all banks with which it has a loan and stays idle for a certain period
before it becomes active again.
The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods market
is global meaning that firms in all regions buy from the same global capital
good producer and therefore have access to the same technologies. On the
consumption goods market demand is determined locally in the sense that all
consumers buy at the local mall located in their region, but supply is global
because every firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the
economy. Labor markets are characterized by spatial frictions determined by
commuting costs that arise if workers accept jobs outside their own region. It
is assumed that firms have access to all banks in the economy and, therefore,
credit markets operate globally.
The choice of the decision rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on
a systematic attempt to incorporate rules that resemble empirically observ-
able behavior documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households,
this means that for example empirically identified saving rules are used and
purchasing choices are described using models from the Marketing litera-
ture with strong empirical support. With respect to firm behavior we follow
the ’Management Science Approach’, which aims at implementing relatively
simple decision rules that match standard procedures of real world firms as
described in the corresponding management literature. A more extensive
discussion of the Management Science approach can be found in Dawid and
Harting (2012).
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can fol-
low either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic
activities take place on a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly
and daily activities all take place following calendar-time or subjective agent-
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time. Agents are activated asynchronously according to their subjective time
schedules that is anchored on an individual activation day. These activation
days are uniformly randomly distributed among the agents at the start of
the simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g., when a household gets
re-employed, its subjective month gets synchronized with the activation day
of its employer due to wage payments). This modeling approach is supposed
to capture the decentralized and typically asynchronous nature of decision
making processes and activities of economic agents.
3.2 Agents, Markets, and Decisions
3.2.1 Output Decision and Production
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor for production.
A firm i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of different vintages v with
v = 1, ..., Vt, where Vt denotes the number of available vintages a time t. The
accumulation of physical capital by a consumption goods producer follows
Kvi,t+1 = (1− δ)Kvi,t + Ivi,t (1)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ivi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage
v.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented
by a Leontief type production function with complementarities between the
qualities of the different vintages of the investment good and the specific skill
level of employees for using these vintages. Vintages are deployed for pro-
duction in descending order by using the best vintage first. For each vintage
the effective productivity is determined by the minimum of its productivity
and the average level of relevant specific skills of the workers. Accordingly,













·min [Av, Bi,t] , (2)
where Av is the productivity of vintage v and Bi,t denotes the average specific
skill level in firms as explained in more detail in Section 3.2.3. The fact that
the considered production function takes into account the vintage structure
of the capital stock and that firms select among different available vintages
enables us to capture the effect of workers’ skills on the incentives of firms
to invest into new technologies (see Section 3.2.4).
Once every month each firm determines the quantities to be produced
and delivered to each regional mall the firm is serving. Actual demand for
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the product of a firm in a given mall and a given month is stochastic (see
below) and there are stock-out costs, because consumers intending to buy the
product of a firm move on to buy from a different producer in case the firm’s
stock at the mall is empty. Therefore, the firm faces a production planning
problem with stochastic demand and stock-out cost. The simplest standard
heuristic used in the corresponding Operations Management literature pre-
scribes to generate an estimation of the distribution of demand and then
choose the planned stock level after delivery such that the (estimated) stock-
out probability during the following month equals a given parameter value
(which is influenced by stock-out costs, inventory costs and risk attitude of
the firm (see e.g. Silver et al. (1998)). Firms in the Eurace@Unibi model fol-
low this simple heuristic, thereby generating a target production quantity for
the considered month. Based on the target production quantity the firm de-
termines the desired input quantities of physical capital and labor. Realizing
this production plan might induce the need to buy new physical capital, hire
new labor or to obtain additional credit. Although there is infinite supply of
physical capital the firm might be rationed on the labor and credit market.
In this case the firm accordingly adjusts its production quantity downwards.
3.2.2 Pricing Decision
Consumption goods producers set the price of their products once a year
which is consistent with empirical observations (see, e.g., Fabiani et al.,
2006). The pricing rule is inspired by the price setting described in Nagle and
Hogan (2006, ch.7), a standard volume on strategic pricing in the Managerial
literature. Firms seek for a profit-maximizing price taking into account the
trade-off between price, sales and costs.
To obtain an indication of the effect of price changes on sales the con-
sumption goods producers carry out simulated purchase surveys (see Nagle
and Hogan, 2006, pp. 300). A representative sample of households is asked
to compare a firm’s product with the set of the currently available rival
products for a range of prices. Households’ answers are based on the same
decision rules they use for their real purchasing decisions. Based on the re-
sulting demand estimations and cost considerations firms choose the price
which maximizes their expected discounted profit stream over their planing
horizons.
3.2.3 Adjustment of Specific Skills of Workers
Each worker h has two dimensions of human capital endowments namely
an exogenously given general skill level bgenh and an endogenously increasing
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specific skill level bh,t. General skills can be interpreted as formal qualification
or general embodied abilities while specific skills are experiences or abilities
obtained on-the-job reflecting the productivity of each worker. For simplicity
it is assumed that only two general skill levels exist bgen ∈ {1, 2}, where
bgen refers to the general skill level. General skills are observable by firms
in the hiring process while specific skills are not. They become observable
during the production process. Acquisition of specific skills in the production
is faster for the higher general skills. Formally, the workers increase the
specific skills over time during production by a learning process. The speed
of learning depends on the general skill level bgenh of the worker h and the
average quality of the technology Ai,t used by employer i:
bh,t+1 = bh,t + χ(b
gen
h ) ·max[0, Ai,t − bh,t]. (3)
Here bh,t are the specific skills of worker h in period t and χ(bgenh ) increases
with general skills bgenh and 0 < χ(b
gen
h ) < 1. The distribution of general
skills in a region is deliberately kept exogenous in the model, since the ef-
fect of changes in this distribution is one of the key policy experiments in
our analysis. Endogenizing the general skill distribution in a region would
require an explicit representation of educational choices and the inclusion of
an education sector, which would make the model much more complex and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2.4 Technological Change
The supply of the capital goods and the process of technological change is
modeled in a very simplified stylized way, since the focus of our analysis lies
on the interaction of the dynamics on the labor and consumption goods mar-
kets. There is a monopolistic capital goods firm that offers different vintages
of the capital good v = 1, ..., Vt, which differ regarding their productivity Av,
at infinite supply. This firm is therefore able to satisfy all emerging capital
demand of consumption goods firms. Furthermore, the capital good is pro-
duced without input factor requirements and, in order to close the model,
all revenues are channeled back into the economy by distributing them to
households in the form of dividends. New vintages become available over
time following a stochastic process. To avoid spurious growth effects, due
to stochastic differences in the dynamic of the technological frontier between
runs, we use in all considered runs the identical realization of the stochastic
process governing the emergence of new vintages.
The pricing of the vintages is modeled as a combination of cost-based and
value-based pricing, where the growth rate in the first term follows the growth
rate of average labor costs and the value-based price component estimates
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the value that each vintage has for a reference firm whose workforce consists
of the economy wide average levels for the specific skills as well as general
skills.
3.2.5 Investment and Vintage Choice
If consumption good producers have a target output level which cannot be
produced with their current capital stock, they acquire new capital. To
this end, a consumption goods firm has to choose from the set of available
vintages. For the decision in which vintage to invest the complementarity
between specific skills and technology plays an important role: due to the
inertia of the specific skill adaptation, the effective productivity of a vintage
with Av > Bi,t is initially below its quality. It converges to Av over time
as the specific skills of workers at the firm catch-up to the quality of the
vintage. Therefore, the firm computes a discounted sum of estimated effec-
tive productivities over a fixed time horizon S. The specific skill evolution is
estimated for each time step within [t, t+S] using (3), where the firm inserts
its average general and specific skill values. A logit choice model based on
the ratio of the estimated effective productivity and price for each available
vintage determines which vintage is ordered. In several parts of the Eu-
race@Unibi model choices of decision makers are described by logit models.
These models are well suited to capture decisions where individuals try to
maximize some objective function which depends on some variables common
to all decision makers and are explicitly represented in the model, as well as
on aspects that are idiosyncratic to each decision maker and captured in the
model by a stochastic term.
3.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
If the current workforce of a firm is not sufficient to produce its target output,
the firm posts vacancies for production workers. The wage it offers has two
constituent parts. The first part is the market driven base wage wbasei,t . The
base wage is paid per unit of specific skill. If the firm cannot fill its vacancies
and the number of unfilled vacancies exceeds some threshold v > 0 the firm
raises the base wage offer by a fraction ϕ to attract more workers, i.e.
wbasei,t+1 = (1 + ϕ)w
base
i,t . (4)
The second part is related to the specific skills. Since the specific skills
represent the (maximal) productivity of the employees the wage wi,t is higher
for higher specific skills. For each of the general-skill groups the firm i offers
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where B¯i,t−1,g are the average specific skills of all employees with general
skill g in the firm. The underlying assumption of this determination of wage
offers is that firms can observe general but not specific skills of job applicants.
Therefore they use the average specific skills of all employees with general
skill g in the firm in order to estimate the specific skills of an applicant with
general skill level g. This wage setting rule is a reduced form representation
of the outcome of firm-level wage negotiations taking into account workers’
expected productivity in the firm as well as workers’ outside option.
An unemployed worker takes the wage offers posted by searching firms
into consideration and compares them with his reservation wage wRh,t. An
unemployed worker will only apply at a firm that makes a wage offer such
that
(1− c)wOi,t,g > wRh,t, (6)
where wRh,t denotes the reservation wage of the worker and c ∈ [0, 1] captures
the commuting costs. If workers and employers are in the same region we
have c = 0. For simplicity it is assumed that workers commute to an employer
outside their own region rather than moving to that region, which means in
particular that the worker consumes in his home region.5
The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current wage if
the worker is employed, and in case of an unemployed worker by his previous
wage, where the reservation wage declines with the duration of unemploy-
ment. The reservation wage never falls below the level of unemployment
benefits. If the unemployed worker receives one or more job offers he accepts
the job offer with the highest wage offer. In case he does not receive any job
offers he remains unemployed.
In case the workforce of a firm is too large relative to its target output
level, the firm adjusts its number of workers, where employees with low gen-
eral skills are dismissed first. Additionally, there is a small probability for
each worker-employee match to be separated in each period. This should
capture job separations due to reasons not explicitly modeled.
5Empirical evidence shows that even if workers move to the region of their employer a
considerable part of their wage income is consumed in their home region due to remittances
sent back. This holds in particular for workers from low productivity countries which
recently joined the EU (see European Commission (2011)).
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3.2.7 Consumption Market Interaction
The consumption goods market is modeled as a decentralized goods market.
Each local market is represented by a mall at which the consumption goods
producers can offer and sell their products to their customers. While firms
are free to serve all malls regardless their spatial proximity, households always
choose the mall which is located in their region.
Households go shopping once a week and try to spend their entire weekly
consumption budget for one good. The consumption budget is determined
using a (piecewise) linear consumption rule according to the buffer-stock
approach (see Carroll (1997) and Allen and Carroll (2001)). At the begin-
ning of their shopping procedure they get information about the prices of all
available goods at the mall, but they get no information about the available
quantities. The decision which good to buy is described using a logit-choice
model with strong empirical foundation in the Marketing literature (see e.g.
Malhotra (1984)). An important parameter in this respect is the coefficient
of the price of a good in the logit choice function. This parameter, denoted
as γC , governs the price sensitivity of consumers and therefore the intensity
of competition between the consumption good producers. Qualitative fea-
tures of the economic dynamics are substantially influenced by changes in
this parameter and therefore we will check the robustness of our qualitative
findings for variations of this parameter.
Households have asynchronized shopping days and thus on each day of
the months there is in general some shopping activity in each mall. The
consumption requests for the different goods are collected by the mall and, if
the total demand for one good exceeds its mall inventory level then the mall
has to ration the demand. In this case the mall sets a rationing quota cor-
responding to the percentage of the total demand that can be satisfied with
the available goods. Each household receives then the indicated percentage
of the requested consumption good.
After the shopping activity rationed households may still have left over
budget. Those households have the opportunity to spend the remaining
budget for another good in a second shopping loop. In this case the shopping
process is repeated as described above.
The production of the consumption goods firm follows a fixed time sched-
ule with fixed production and delivery dates. Even if the mall stock is com-
pletely sold out it can only be refilled at the fixed delivery date. Consequently,
all the demand that exceeds the expected value of the monthly sales plus the
additional buffer cannot be satisfied.
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3.3 Parametrization and Validation
In order to determine the values and ranges of parameters to be used in the
policy experiments we follow an approach that combines direct estimation
of parameters for which empirical observations are available with an indi-
rect calibration approach in order to establish confidence in the ability of
the model to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant for real world
economic dynamics. Standard constellations have been identified, where val-
ues of parameters are chosen to reflect empirical evidence whenever possible
and where a large set of stylized facts can be reproduced. Furthermore, the
fact that the development of the Eurace@Unibi model follows as far as pos-
sible the Management Science approach, briefly discussed above, provides
empirical grounding to individual decision rules, thereby addressing the im-
portant point of empirical micro-foundations for modeled behavior. The set
of macroeconomic stylized facts that have been reproduced by the standard
constellations of the Eurace@Unibi model includes persistent growth, low
positive inflation and a number of important business cycle properties: per-
sistent fluctuations of output; pro-cyclical movement of employment, con-
sumption and investment, where relative sizes of amplitudes qualitatively
match those reported e.g. in Stock and Watson (1999), counter-cyclical
movement of wages and firm mark-ups. On the industry level the model
generates persistent heterogeneity in firm-size, profit rates, productivity and
prices in accordance with empirical observations reported e.g. in Dosi et al.
(1997). Also labor market regularities, like the Beveridge curve, are repro-
duced by the model with benchmark parameter constellations. The reader is
referred to Dawid et al. (2012b) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
Tables with the list of parameter values used in the simulations underlying
this paper are provided in the Online-Appendix.
4 Policy Analysis
4.1 General Setup, Method of Policy Evaluation, Con-
sidered Policies
Our policy experiments are concerned with the convergence between a high
tech and a low tech region in a two-region version of the model described
above. Table 1 summarizes the initializations of the key variable for the two
distinct regions R1 and R2. At time t = 0 the quality of the capital stock in
the high tech region R1 is set to 1.5, and to 1.0 in the low tech region. The
choice of the (adapting) specific skills corresponds initially to the quality of
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Table 1: Initialization of capital stock and skills
Region 1 (R1): high tech Region 2 (R2): low tech
Initial quality of capital stock 1.5 1.0
Initial specific skills 1.5 1.0
General skill distribution 0.8/0.2 0.2/0.8
the capital stock. In R1 80% of the workers have high general skills, and the
remaining part has low general skills. For R2 the general skill distribution
is inverted. The technological frontier at t = 0 is set to a quality of 1.7 and
afterwards grows at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. Firms in both regions may
purchase an investment good of that quality, i.e. investment goods markets
are integrated from the beginning of the simulation. The same holds for the
consumption goods markets.
Within this setup we mimic the European Union integration policies by
introducing a subsidy scheme that influences firms’ investment incentives,
and by altering the general skill distributions in the two regions. More specif-
ically, we are running two policy experiments:
1. In what we are going to call the Human Capital Policy (HC) the general
skill level of R2 is upgraded to the general skill level of R1.
2. In what we are going to call Technology Policy (Tech) firms’ invest-
ments in R2 are subsidized if equipment is bought from the technolog-
ical frontier.
A more detailed description of the two policies is given below. Both the
HC-policy and the Tech-policy are applied to two scenarios. In one scenario
labor markets in the two regions are fully integrated. This means that workers
face only small commuting costs (c = 0.05). In the second scenario, labor
markets are separated implying that working in the region other than the
own residence region causes prohibitively high commuting costs (c = 1).
In each of the two scenarios (c = 0.05 and c = 1) we consider three
treatments in addition to the base scenario: only HC-policy, only Tech-policy
and both policies. For each of the four cases 15 runs are conducted, with
each run encompassing 750 months. The time series are pooled and the policy
effects are estimated using penalized spline methods (see, e.g., Kauermann
et al., 2009). More technically, the isolated effects and the interacted effects
of the policies are evaluated with
Yt,p,i = s(t) + I[p(HC)=1]sHC(t) + I[p(Tech)=1]sTech(t) + I[p(HC)=p(Tech)=1]sInt(t)
+η0i + η
1
i t+ εt,p,i, (7)
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where Yt,p,i is the outcome variable at iteration t, for policy p, and run i.
The baseline spline is s(t) to which the policy splines are added with dummy
variables I indicating if the policy is turned on or off. The linear term
involving η0i and η1i captures run-specific random effects and εt,p,i is the error
term. The standard deviation of the spline estimates will also be plotted in
the figures in order to illustrate significance of the different policy effects over
time.6
4.2 Baseline Simulation With No Policies
With no policy treatment we get output trajectories as shown in Figure 1.
The left panel refers to an integrated labor market and the right hand panel
to a separated labor market with high commuting costs. In both scenar-
ios the initial output levels are equal. As time elapses, however, completely
different growth patterns emerge. For the high tech region R1 (black line)
output grows constantly and almost quadruples until the end of the simula-
tion period. The low tech region R2 (red line) experiences a drop in output
and eventually recovers showing relatively low output growth. Overall, there
is strong divergence of regional output levels. With separated labor markets,
output increases in both regions but output growth is stronger in the high
tech region, again leading to diverging output levels, although less extreme
than in the integrated labor market scenario. Toward the end of the sim-
ulation output is lower in region 1 and higher in region 2 for closed labor
markets as compared to integrated labor markets. Looking step by step into
the evolution of the technologies, prices, and labor flow patterns will reveal
the economic mechanism behind the results for the baseline simulation with
no policies.
Figure 2 plots the trajectories for the exogenously evolving technological
frontier, and the average technology used by firms for the two regions. Again,
the left panel refers to an integrated labor market and the right panel to
separated labor markets. For integrated labor markets, the gap between the
technological frontier and average technology employed by firms for region
1 (black line) increases over time. As the gap stays approximately constant
for region 2, average quality of technology employed in region 2 approaches
6All figures are based on estimations using the R function gamm() from the package
mgcv (see e.g. Wood (2011)). Although residuals in our estimation show some autocorre-
lation we abstain from estimating a computationally much more intensive and less stable
model with AR(p) structure of the noise terms. Krivobokova and Kauermann (2007)
have shown that the spline estimations are robust with respect to misspecified correlation
structures, and therefore no qualitative changes of our results should be expected even if
a model with more elaborated correlation structure would be used.
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Figure 1: The evolution of output (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated
labor markets (black line: R1; red line R2)
that in region 1. For separated labor markets, region 1 stays closer to the
technological frontier than with integrated labor markets. Moreover, region
2’s technology gap to the frontier is increasing so that in this scenario the
technological advantage of the firms in region 1 increases over time. Average
technology actually used is closely related to the evolution of the output
levels shown before. The catch-up of average quality of technology employed
in region 2 in the scenario of integrated labor markets is a consequence of
two factors, which are both driven by the strong (initial) reduction in output
produced in region 2. First, as can be seen by considering the dynamics of the
distribution of firm output in a region (not reported here), the downturn in
region 2 has a strong selection effect in that region. Only a few firms survive,
namely those that due to early high vintage choices have the best capital
stocks, and they produce only small quantities. Second, given the low total
output in region 2, the few surviving firms only use the qualitatively more
advanced vintages. Whereas firms in region 1, given relatively high output,
make also use of the older vintages, which reduces the average quality of
technology.
Output patterns can be traced down to relative demand for products
produced in region 1 and 2. These relative demands are a function of the
relative prices that firms from region 1 and 2 charge. As Figure 3 reveals,
prices of products from region 2 are higher than those from firms in region
1 for the open labor market scenario, which explains the strongly diverging
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Figure 2: The evolution of technologies (a) integrated labor markets, (b) sep-
arated labor markets (green line: technological frontier; black line: average
technology used in R1; red line: average technology used in R2)
output patterns. With labor costs making up a considerably large share
of production costs, and prices being set as a mark-up on unit costs, we
can relate the price pattern to the labor flows which arise as regional labor
markets are opened. Figure 4 plots numbers of workers with low general
skills (left panel) and high general skills (right panel) for integrated labor
markets. One sees, that there is a significant drop in the number of workers,
both high skill and low skill, in region 2. Early on firms in region 2 have
to increase their base wage offer in order to attract workers in spite of the
lower productivity implied by the lower quality of their capital stock. This
increases their unit costs and further deepens their competitive disadvantage.
However, starting approximately at month 150, the few firms in region 2 have
reached a wage level that enables them to attract more and more high general
skill workers. This reinforces their incentives to invest in high vintages and
they are able to close the gap to region 1 with respect to the quality of their
capital stock. Eventually, at about period 400 the need for additional base
wage increases vanishes for firms in region 2 due to the positive evolution of
the productivity and the diverging pattern between the regions with respect
to prices stops. Output produced and sold by the firms in region 2 starts
increasing and the growth of the output gap between the regions becomes
smaller (see Figure 1 (a)). The return movement of low skilled workers
induced by this expansion in region 2 however then negatively affects the
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Figure 3: The evolution of mean prices (a) integrated labor markets, (b)
separated labor markets (black line: R1; red line R2)
skill mix in region 2, which reduces incentives for firms to invest in new
technologies. This stops the technological catch-up process by region 2 and
the output gap increases again.
As can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 3, for separated labor markets the
productivity advantage of firms in region 1 does not translate to a competitive
advantage for this region. In this scenario wages in region 2 stay below the
level in region 1 such that unit costs in both regions are approximately equal.
The observation that nevertheless total output produced in region 1 is higher
than that produced in region 2 can be explained by the larger production
capacity of firms in region 1. The initial advantage of region 1 in this respect
is never eliminated in the absence of a price advantage of either of the two
regions. The costs for firms in region 2 associated with an expansion of their
capacity would be so high such that an induced competitive disadvantage
would result for these firms. Due to the pricing and production planing rules
of the firms they realize this and abstain from expansion such that the initial
capacity advantage for region 1 (which stems from the larger productivity of
capital in that region) is cemented.
Overall, the baseline simulations show that in the absence of any cohesion
policy measures region 2 does not catch-up to region 1 either with respect to
output or to technology in both considered labor market scenarios.
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Figure 4: Commuters for integrated labor markets (a) low general skill, (b)
high general skill (black line: workers from R1 working in R1; red line:
workers from R2 working in R2; blue line: workers from R1 commuting to
R2; green line: workers from R2 commuting to R1).
4.3 Effect of Human Capital Policy
First we examine the dynamic effects of the human capital policy. We assume
that the policy is implemented at the point in time where the two regions
enter their economic union (t = 0), but, since the build-up of human capital
takes time, the effects of the policy become apparent only after a delay of
ten years. At t = 120 the distribution of general skills in region 2 becomes
identical to that of region 1.7 Clearly the assumption that the gap in general
skills can be completely closed by the human capital policy within ten years
is very strong, but since we are mainly interested in understanding the quali-
tative differences in the policy effects in different economic environments, an
exact quantification of the policy strength is of minor concern to us.
Figure 5 shows the effect of the HC-policy output in both regions for
integrated and separated labor markets as estimated by the penalized spline
model discussed above (i.e. we show the estimated splines sHC(t) in both
scenarios). The policy effect is strikingly different, depending on whether
the labor market is integrated or not. With an integrated labor market the
7For reasons of simplicity it is assumed that all individuals upgrade their skill exactly
at t = 120. A more gradual skill upgrading over time would be more realistic, but would
not qualitatively alter the effects we identify. The set of individuals who upgrade their
skill is selected randomly.
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Figure 5: The effect of the human capital policy on output for (a) integrated
labor markets, (b) separated labor markets (black line: R1, red line: R2).
effect on output in the target region 2 is negative, whereas output in region
1 is positively affected. These effects are not transitory, rather they seem to
become more substantial as time evolves. A very different picture emerges
in the scenario with separated labor markets. In this case the policy has
no significant effect for an initial time interval (t = 120 to approximately
t = 200), but afterward leads to an increase in the output produced in region
2, whereas the output in region 1 is negatively affected. Aggregating over
both regions it can be observed that the effect of the HC-policy on total
output in both regions is positive, and that the effect is much stronger if
labor markets are separated. Hence, spatial frictions, preventing the free
allocation of workers across regions, positively affect the overall effects of
this policy.
The negative output effect of the HC-policy in region 2 arises from two
countervailing forces. As intended by the HC-policy improving the workers
general skills has a positive effect on firms productivity through the vintage
choice. Firms in region 2 become more productive due to easier access to
workers with high general skills. Figure 6 depicts the estimated effect of the
HC-policy on the ratio of average vintage choice and general skills, respec-
tively, between firms in region 2 and region 1.8 The two lines (plus standard
deviation bands) in each panel describe the effects of the policy in the sce-
8Technically speaking equation (7) is estimated for Yt,p,i =
v¯c2t,p,i
v¯c1t,p,i
, where v¯crt,p,i denotes
the average vintage choice at time t of all firms in region r in run i under policy p.
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nario with integrated and separated labor markets, respectively. A positive
sign of the estimated effect means that due to the HC policy the average
value of the considered variable in region 2 has increased relative to region
1. Panel (a) of this figure shows that the average vintage choice of firms in
region 2 increases relative to the the choice of firms in region 1 as a response
to the HC-policy. The policy effect is, furthermore, larger for separated than
for integrated labor markets. However, the policy sparks another indirect
mechanism that overcompensates the positive effect on vintage choices so
that the overall effect on investment becomes negative. Let us turn to this
more involved second effect now.
As the policymakers improve general skills in region 2, the relative en-
dowment of region 2 with high general skills improves. This is less so if labor
markets are integrated, see Figure 6 (panel (b)), because high skilled work-
ers from region 2 get job offers from firms in region 1 that net of commuting
costs improve their earnings. High skilled workers from region 2 therefore
eventually work in region 1. As a result, firms in region 2 have problems
filling their vacancies. They start making higher wage offers. Figure 7 (panel
(a)) shows that wage offers of firms in region 2 relative to wage offers of firms
in region 1 increase as a response to the HC-policy for integrated labor mar-
kets. It decreases for separated labor markets as the HC-policy increased the
supply of high skilled workers in region 2 relative to region 1. As labor costs
constitute a considerable share of firms’ production costs, unit costs for firms
in region 2 relative to region 1 increase for integrated labor markets, and
decrease for separated labor markets, see panel (b) of Figure 7. The unfor-
tunate effect on relative unit costs for region 2 with integrated labor markets
ceases around period 500. However, firms in region 2 react to the alignment
of costs between the two regions by an increase in mark-ups rather than by a
decrease in price (see panel (d) of Figure 7). The reason for this is that firms
in region 2 anticipate that the expansion corresponding to substantial own
price decreases would be associated with considerable investments (which
are not needed by the firms in region 1, which already have larger produc-
tion capacities) and hence maximization of their estimated discounted profit
streams yields substantial increases in mark-ups when their costs converge
toward those of firms in region 1. Overall, region 2 suffers from a loss of
competitiveness as a result of the improvement of the skills of its labor force
when labor markets are integrated. Charging higher prices than firms in the
competing region 1, firms in region 2 are losing demand. As lower output
is produced also investments and the diffusion of new vintages decrease so
that the overall effect on the productivity weighted capital stock9 is negative
9The productivity weighted capital stock is a measure that captures the size and the
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Figure 6: The relative effect of the human capital policy on (a) vintage choice
and (b) general skill mix, computed as the effect on the ratio of variable values
from Region 2 to that from Region 1 (black line: integrated labor market,
red line: separated labor markets).
in the region at which the policy is targeted for integrated labor markets
(Figure 8 (a)). The observation that due to labor flows a policy improving
the general skills of (local) inhabitants might have negative effects on growth
in regions where productivity is relatively small is consistent with empirical
results reported in Aghion et al. (2009).
Summarizing, we observe that the HC-policy only has the intended effect
of fostering convergence if the spatial labor market frictions are large. In
case that labor is mobile across borders the policy has detrimental effects
for the target region 2 with respect to output and technological development
since the indirect negative effect stemming from the deterioration of the
relative competitiveness of region 2 firms dominates the direct positive effect
on vintage choices induced by the skill upgrading of the local labor force.
4.4 Effect of Technology Policy
Quite a different picture emerges compared to our discussion in the previous
subsection if we consider the implications of the Tech-policy. Under the Tech-
policy a firm which invests in physical capital of the highest vintage that is
quality of the capital stock of a firm. It is computed as a weighted sum of the capital with






















































































Figure 7: The relative effect of the human capital policy on (a) base wage
offers, (b) unit costs, (c) prices and (d) mark ups, computed as the effect on
the ratio of variable values from Region 2 to that from Region 1 (black line:
integrated labor market, red line: separated labor market)
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Figure 8: The effect of the human capital policy on the productivity weighted
capital stocks for (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated labor markets
(black line: R1, red line: R2).
available at the time of the purchase receives a public subsidy in the amount
of 5% of its investment. When deciding about their vintage choice firms take
that subsidy into account. In their vintage choice rule the price is reduced
for the vintage on the frontier accordingly. This distorts the vintage choice
of firms in the target region in favor of the best available vintage. As can be
seen in Figure 9, a targeted technology policy, leads to an increase in output
produced in region 2, no matter whether the labor market is integrated or
separated. The effect is much stronger if labor markets are integrated and
and in this scenario there is a significant negative effect on output in region
1, which is not present under separated labor markets.
For separated labor markets the effects of the Tech-policy is qualitatively
very similar to the effect of the HC-policy. The two policies are close sub-
stitutes. This holds not only for the output dynamics, but also for variables
like quality of capital, vintage choice and price. In our discussion we will,
therefore, concentrate on the effects of the Tech-policy under integrated labor
markets.
Figure 10 shows for this scenario the implications of the introduction of
a Tech-policy for the dynamics of ratios between region 2 and region 1 for
vintage choice, average quality of capital, general skills, as well as the average
price of the consumption goods. The direct effect of the policy, namely an
increase in the vintage choice of firms in region 2, can be clearly seen in panel
(a) of this figure. In particular, this figure shows that the vintage choice in
28





























Figure 9: Effect of the Tech-policy on output in region 1 (black line) and
region 2 (red line) for (a) integrated labor markets and (b) separated labor
markets.
region 2 goes up relative to that of region 1, which means that the gap in
terms of quality of newly acquired machines is reduced. As shown in panel (b)
this results in an increase in the relative quality of the capital stock used by
firms in region 2. The improvement of the quality of the capital stock induces
that firms in region 2 are better able to keep workers with high general skills
in their region (see panel (c)), such that the technology policy also has a
positive effect on the human capital stock in region 2. In particular, this
policy although not explicitly targeted at human capital upgrading, is able
to improve the level of human capital employed in region 2 relative to region
1. Also in this respect the policy performs better than the HC-policy whose
explicit aim is to improve the human capital endowment in region 2. The
improved quality of physical and human capital employed in region 2 leads to
a reduction in the price gap between the two regions (panel (d)) and thereby
improves the competitiveness of region 2 leading to the observed positive
effect on output produced by region 2 firms. The higher competitiveness of
region 2 comes at the expense of firms in region 1, whose output actually goes
down. Considering the isolated effect of the policy on region 1 variables shows
a negative effect on vintage choice and average capital quality for that region,
which is due to the increase in attractiveness of high vintages for region 2
firms, thereby inducing an increase in relative prices of these vintages.
The technology policy considered in our analysis so far is targeted, in
a sense that firms only receive price subsidies if they acquire the highest
29





















































































Figure 10: The relative effect of the technology policy on (a) vintage choice
and (b) average quality of the capital stock and (c) general skills of workers
employed in a region and (d) average price posted by firms, computed as the
the effect on the ratio of variable values from Region 2 to that from Region
1 (black line: integrated labor market, red line: separated labor market) ï¿œ
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: Comparison of the effect of the targeted (black line) and non-
targeted (red line) Tech-policy on output in (a) region 1 and (b) region 2,
for integrated labor markets.
available vintage. In practice such a targeted policy might be difficult to
implement, since it is not easily verifiable whether an acquired machine is
indeed at the technological frontier of the considered industry. Hence, one
might wonder whether it is essential that price subsidies are targeted to the
best vintages. Similarly to the considered Tech-policy general investment
subsidies could be introduced, where firms receive a 5% subsidy on all acqui-
sitions of physical capital. Such a measure should foster investment, thereby
inducing a faster diffusion of new technologies, as well as reduce firms’ unit
costs and costs of expansion, which should lead to lower prices and larger
output by region 2 firms. Figure 11 shows however that such a policy has a
much weaker effect on output in both regions. In the absence of the stim-
ulation of high vintage choices in region 2 the quality of capital does not
increase as much as under the targeted technology policy and the fraction
of high skilled workers in the region is not as high. The competitive dis-
advantage of region 2 with respect to unit costs, which can be completely
eliminated with a targeted technology policy is reduced but not eliminated
with an untargeted version of the policy.10 This shows that it is indeed im-
portant that investment subsidies are targeted in a way that the incentives
of firms to acquire new vintages are increased.
10The time series data from simulations backing these observations are available from
the authors on request.
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4.5 Robustness of Qualitative Findings
Our discussion of the effects of the HC and the Tech-policy was based on
simulations carried out for our default parameter setting and two labor mar-
ket scenarios, namely c = 0.05 and c = 1. We have carried out substantial
robustness checks to confirm that the qualitative findings stay intact also if
we vary the parameters within a reasonable range. The robustness of the
results with respect to changes in the most important parameters are briefly
discussed in this subsection.
In Figure 12 we show the spline estimates of the evolution of output
without policy, of the impact of the HC policy, and the impact of the Tech-
policy in the two regions for values of the commuting costs varying between
c = 0.05 and c = 0.5. We restrict attention to this interval because c = 0.5
corresponds already to a de-facto separated labor market, and hence there are
virtually no effects of varying c in the interval [0.5, 1]. To keep the graphs
readable we abstain from showing the standard deviations for the shown
spline estimates. From panels (a) and (b) it can be clearly seen that in the
absence of policies the output in region 1 is monotonically decreasing and
output in region 2 monotonously increasing with respect to the commuting
costs for any considered time t, but the effect becomes much more pronounced
in the long run. Considering the effect of the HC-policy the figure shows
that the negative implications of the policy in the target region for the case
of integrated labor markets apply to values of the commuting costs up to
approximately c = 0.15. In this range the effect for region 1 is positive
as discussed above. Only for commuting costs above this level is region 2
positively affected by the policy, where the positive effects is strongest for a
scenario where spatial labor market frictions are considerable, but markets
are not fully separated. Also the qualitative findings concerning the effects of
the Tech-policy are confirmed. The effect is positive in region 2 and negative
in region 1, where the sizes of these effects decrease as spatial labor market
frictions increase.
We have carried out numerous robustness checks with respect to vari-
ations of other parameters, in order to check whether the key qualitative
findings – in particular the observations that the HC-policy has negative ef-
fects for integrated and positive effects for separated labor markets in the
target region, whereas effects of the Tech-policy are always positive – stay
intact. Robustness of this kind could be confirmed for all considered param-
eters. In the Appendix we present such robustness checks for two additional
key parameters, which have been identified as most influential for the char-











































































































































Figure 12: Effects of a variation of commuting costs on the evolution of
output ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital policy ((c) and
(d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in Region 1
(left column) and Region 2 (right column).
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have used the agent-based macroeconomic Eurace@Unibi
model to analyze in how far two types of cohesion policies, which are inspired
by measures applied by the European Union, are suitable to foster conver-
gence between regions that differ with respect to their initial endowments in
the quality of physical and human capital. We have shown that both types
of policies have the intended effects as long as labor is sufficiently immobile.
With integrated labor markets the human capital policy has detrimental out-
put effects for the region at which the policy is targeted. Technology policy,
implemented through subsidies for acquisition of physical capital is effective,
and particularly so if the subsidy is targeted and only paid if firms invest in
vintages at the technological frontier.
We have explored the mechanisms underlying the different policy effects
and shown that these effects are driven by the interplay of firms’ vintage
choices and investment decisions. While the former is a straightforward and
expected outcome of the policies, the latter is the product of an economic
mechanism resulting from the cohesion policies that affect the evolution of
relative output through changes in regions’ competitiveness which in turn
result from the dynamics of the (general and specific) skill levels of workers
in the two regions. It turns out that for HC-policies the indirect effect on
investments arising through the reduction in the regions’ competitiveness is
so strong that the policy has a negative effect on (productivity weighted)
capital stock and output in the target region for integrated labor markets.
To put these findings into perspective it should be pointed out that firms
in the two regions are actually identical in many respects. The firms share
the same production functions, households share the same rules determining
their savings, their consumption decision etc. and apart from the subsidies
introduced in the framework of the Tech-policy the public (fiscal) policies
are the same in both regions. In the baseline scenario the two regions differ
only with respect to the initial quality of the physical capital stock, with
respect to the initial distribution of specific skills in the two regions and with
respect to the general skill distributions. Since the first two of these three
items refer to initial values of endogenous variables of the model, the only
structural difference between the two regions is the difference with respect
to general skills.
This asymmetry disappears once the HC-policy, which makes the general
skill distribution in region 2 equal to that of region 1, is introduced. Con-
sidering the long run equilibrium balanced growth path of this two-region
economy one would therefore expect that regardless of the spatial labor mar-
ket frictions the two regions grow at the same rate. Furthermore, according
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to such an analysis, the effect of the HC-policy would always be positive for
region 2 regardless of the amount of labor market frictions. The analysis in
this paper also takes into account the short and medium run implications of
the policies, which arguably for many issues is the most relevant time-frame
for policy evaluation, and we obtain much richer and more differentiated in-
sights into the effects of the considered policy measures. In particular, the
fact that the economic dynamics of the two regions is explicitly simulated al-
lows to capture path dependencies, which in this framework are crucial for the
understanding of the policy implications in the different considered scenar-
ios. These path dependencies, which hinge on the interplay of firms’ stocks of
physical and human capital with their vintage choices, investment decisions
and worker movements between firms, generate obstacles to overcome the
initial regional asymmetry and leads to a diversion of positive policy effects
from the target region toward the high tech region 1. Overall, these findings
illustrate the merits of an agent-based approach for the analysis of effects of
different policy measures and their combination in different time-frames.
More broadly speaking, from the policy perspective our results suggest
that distinct policies aiming to speed up convergence are offsetting each other.
As we have shown, the HC-policy and the Tech-policy are more effective with
respect to achieving convergence if labor markets are not integrated. This in-
sight from our model squares well with findings from the empirical literature
on the effect of EU funding. While there does not seem to be a clear-cut pic-
ture emerging from empirical studies, as we outlined earlier on, there seems to
be evidence that EU policies may foster convergence between countries while
they rather fail to spur convergence between regions. Interpreting the differ-
ences between countries and regions as workers being more mobile between
regions and less mobile between countries, this part of the empirical evidence
on the effects of EU policies is what our model predicts for HC-policies. Thus
policies, that target the improvement of labor mobility between regions may
render policies targeting the cohesion of regions ineffective.
A Appendix
A.1 Robustness Checks
In this appendix we show the robustness of our findings with respect to a
variation of two specific parameters of the model, which both have a con-
siderable impact on the simulation outcome. The two parameters, the price
sensitivity of consumers and the speed of change of the technological fron-
tier, have been identified in extensive experiments with the model as the
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parameters that have the largest impact on the qualitative properties of the
simulation dynamics. Hence we report our robustness checks with respect to
these two parameters here. Additional robustness checks for other param-
eters have been done but effects of parameter variations turned out to be
much weaker.
The first considered parameter specifies the price sensitivity in the con-
sumption choice problem of households. The decision which good to purchase
is modeled as a logit model where the probability to buy a particular good
depends on its relative price. The weight of the price in the logit function,
which can also be interpreted as the intensity of choice, is given by the pa-
rameter γC . Varying this parameter changes the strength of how households
react to price changes and thus it determines the scope for price changes of
individual firms and the overall competitiveness on the consumption goods
market. In the experiment we use a value of γC = 9.0 that is associated
with a medium level of competitiveness. For the robustness check this pa-
rameter is varied within a range between 7.0 and 11.0, which is a range in
accordance with empirical estimations obtained for consumption good mar-
kets (see Krishnamruthi and Raj (1988)). Figure 13 shows how the variation
of this parameter affects the evolution of the regional output in the initially
less developed region 2 and how the variation of the parameter influences
the effectiveness of the human capital and technology policy in this region.
It can be clearly seen that the qualitative features worked out for the de-
fault parameter setting, namely that the effect of the HC-policy is negative
for integrated and positive for separated labor markets, whereas the effect
of the Tech-policy is positive in both labor market scenarios stay intact for
the entire considered range of the parameter γC . An interesting additional
observation is that the size of the negative respectively positive impact of the
policies under an integrated labor market goes down if the consumption good
market becomes more competitive. The intuition for this observation is that
in such a strongly competitive environment the weaker region 2 shows almost
no growth without policy (see panel (a)), which, on the one hand, means that
there is little to lose by the ill-suited application of the HC-policy. On the
other hand, even with the help of the Tech-policy, the growth in region 2 is
very slow in the presence of the intensive competition of firms from region 1.
The second parameter with a strong impact on the simulations is the
speed of technological change. As described in Section 3.2.4 the development
of improved capital goods is the result of a stochastic process, where with
an exogenously given probability a new vintage emerges whose productivity
is improved by ∆qinv compared to the previous best practice technology. In
the experiments, we use identical realizations of the stochastic innovation
process in order to avoid spurious growth effects due to different dynamics
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of the frontier. To check the robustness of the policy analysis with respect
to different speeds of technological growth, we keep using the same realiza-
tion of the stochastic process determining the period when innovations take
place, but vary the parameter for the productivity progress ∆qinv at each
innovation step within a range of 0.0 and 0.07. Thereby, a value of 0.0 means
no technological progress. In the policy experiments we use a value of 0.05
that translates to an average productivity growth of the frontier by 1.8% per
annum. Figure 14 shows the impact on the output evolution and the policy
effectiveness in region 2. Again, it can be clearly seen that all qualitative


















































































































Figure 13: Effects of a variation of households’ price sensitivity on the evo-
lution of output without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human
capital policy ((c) and (d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e)
and (f)) in the lagging Region 2 for integrated (left column) and separated














































































































































Figure 14: Effects of a variation of the speed of technological change on
the evolution of output without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the
human capital policy ((c) and (d)), and the effectiveness of the technology
policy ((e) and (f)) in the lagging Region 2 for integrated (left column) and
separated (right column) labor markets.
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